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ing up in the process of habit formation. In the first group the animals that had previously made normal records, without the alcohol treatment, were found to make slower average records when the treatment was instituted, and in like manner, the second group showed that when the alcohol treatment and the maze learning were begun at the same time the daily records were again inferior to those of the control group.

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## REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

*A Realistic Universe.* JOHN ELOF BOODIN. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1916. Pp. xxii + 412.

May a pragmatist be a metaphysician? And if so, what sort of metaphysics would it be? An affirmative and constructive answer to these questions is given by Professor John E. Boodin in *A Realistic Universe*, a rather large volume of 412 pages.

It was the boast of Kant that he had banished metaphysics from the domain of philosophical inquiry. Philosophy as criticism must thenceforth confine itself to a theory of knowledge. It has seemed that pragmatism, at least here in America, has been advancing along the lines marked out by Kant. It began as a method, advanced to a theory of truth, continued as an analysis of experience, and is now applying this analysis to the concrete problems of life and conduct. It might well be termed the new criticism. The center of gravity in philosophy, due to the pragmatic criticism, has been rapidly shifting from metaphysics to an analysis of moral, social, economic, and political problems.

In view of this apparent abdication of metaphysics, and the drift of philosophy toward the social sciences, the appearance of a book on pragmatic metaphysics is both significant and interesting. I don't know that the pragmatist has so much ignored metaphysics as that he has been interested in doing other things.

*A Realistic Universe* is a metaphysical treatise written from the pragmatic point of view issuing in a doctrine of realism. Pragmatism, metaphysics, realism—that is the combination effected in Professor Boodin's book, an alliance requiring a good deal of insight and adjustment to maintain.

In general, one may say that the possibility of metaphysics depends on the power of thought to comprehend reality. The new realism can easily issue in metaphysics because the new realist takes

such a view of the function in thought that metaphysics is a possibility. When Kant said "the rational is the phenomenal," of course thought was inadequate to arrive at a knowledge of things in themselves. But when Hegel pointed out that the phenomenal *is* the real, and that, therefore, "the real is the rational," the relevancy of thought to reality seemed established. New realism is just as extreme an intellectualism as Hegelianism. Its underlying assumption is that what is true for intellectual analysis is at the same time true for reality. The new realist equates reality with logical analysis, just as when Porphyry was dichotomizing the concept of being, he thought it was being that he was dividing. For new realism, as for Hegel, logic and metaphysics are one and the same thing.

Bergson, on the other hand, denies outright the relevancy of thought to reality. There is no approach to metaphysics through intellectual analysis.

Now the pragmatist accepts neither the extreme intellectualism of the realist, nor the anti-intellectualism of Bergson. It is for this reason that the possibility of a pragmatic metaphysics is an interesting inquiry. Can you accept the pragmatic doctrine of the origin, nature, and function of intelligence, and at the same time, with intelligence as your instrument, give a constructive metaphysics? Professor Boodin thinks that you can. He writes: "Let us give thought a fair field at the outset. Let us not discredit the instrument because it has a character of its own. It could not be an instrument otherwise. The universe in its own selective movement forged it, in the long ages, for just such a world as ours and such needs as ours" (p. xvi.). Pragmatic metaphysics steers a middle course. Between life whole, but unanalyzed (Bergson), and life analyzed, but dead (new realism), there is the experimental alternative of *vivisection*.

Professor Boodin is very clear in his initial definitions. "As applied to metaphysics the pragmatic method means that we must judge the nature of reality, in its various grades and complexities, by the consequences to the realization of human purposes, instead of *a priori* assumptions" (p. vii.). By reality, then, he means the differences made to our reflective purposes. "These differences are capable of being systematized into certain attributes—*summa genera* of differences not further reducible" (p. 385). There are five such attributes which constitute the subject-matter of metaphysics. They are: energy, consciousness, space, time, and form. These attributes are not in any sense ideal or phenomenal; they are genuine aspects of reality. Therein consists the author's realism. The book is, therefore, divided into five parts, each treating separately one of the five attributes.

Part I. is on "Being" or the "stuff character of reality." By stuff the author means energy. This division of the book is especially valuable as containing a philosophical analysis of the scientific concept of energy. It is a resumé of the position of contemporary science. Part II. deals with the attribute of consciousness. The subject of the nature of consciousness is the topic which has received a great amount of attention during recent years. The chapter entitled "Examination of Theories" contains a fairly comprehensive account of current theories. The author's own view has much in common with the diaphanous theory of Mr. G. E. More. Consciousness makes the difference of awareness. It is a "neutral light," colorless, without differentiation, mechanism, or efficiency. Parts III. and IV. deal with space and time, respectively. Each is treated in realistic fashion, its reality depending on the difference it makes to our reflective procedure, space making the difference of "translation," and time that of "transformation." The author's treatment of time has much in common with that of Bergson, though it was worked out in independence of him. The fact of change, of process, of productivity demands the objective reality of time.

Part V. treats of form, that is, of the direction and evaluation of things. Nowhere has the pragmatic reaction broken more abruptly with tradition than in its treatment of progress. Modern philosophy has presented progress as a sort of pensioning on the part of the absolute. Pragmatism has modified the absolutistic doctrine of ready-made objectives into a doctrine of projectives, they being framed by intelligence as means of advancement and control. Where are things headed? That depends, the pragmatist is likely to say, on where you want them to go. Give a circle consciousness and it will go straight to circularity. But then circularity is there to go to. But where is reality headed? The objective reality and productivity of time forces the question to an issue. In answer to the question Professor Boodin develops a doctrine of teleological idealism. Direction is a metaphysical attribute, and consequently a sound basis for a faith philosophy.

In this brief notice of Professor's Boodin's book I have made no attempt at critical estimation. I am only calling attention to a noteworthy and well-nigh novel endeavor, that of writing a pragmatic metaphysics.

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*Experiments in Educational Psychology.* DANIEL STARCH. Revised and Enlarged. New York: Macmillan Company. 1917. Pp. ix + 204.

The first edition of this book was published in 1911, and was re-